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 ABSTRACT: 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether a certain type of ownership structure can 
increase corporate performance, measured by using the relationship between market valuation 
and intrinsic value, Tobin’s Q. An examination of 89 Nasdaq OMX Helsinki listed companies in 
2014-2018 provides evidence of a direct relationship between the ownership structure and 
corporate performance. Specifically, this thesis aims to answer the controversial question of 
how different ownership types, voting power and CEO ownership behave with respect to 
corporate performance. The ownership types are separated into corporations, families, foreign 
investors, foundations, investment advisors, pension and insurance companies, and the state. 
 
A growing body of literature have examined the association between ownership structure and 
corporate performance, while the geographic concentration has limited mostly to large market 
economies and emerging markets. As a geographic area, Northern Europe is still quite 
unexplored. Due to the gap of existing literature concerning the relationship between ownership 
structure and corporate performance in Finnish capital markets, this thesis contributes to earlier 
research by concentrating on the latest evidence of ownership structures in Finnish listed 
companies. The theoretical framework of this thesis is built around earlier academic know-how, 
which argues that companies seek to adjust their ownership structures to enhance monitoring 
and controlling possibilities, and at the same time, to lower agency costs. Evidently, this leads 
to efficient operational performance.  
 
The main results of this thesis propose that, typically, investment advisors and pension and 
insurance companies as a major owner enhance company performance, whilst foundations have 
an inverse relationship with respect to forward-looking financial ratio, Tobin’s Q. The voting 
rights of a company have a negative impact on corporate performance, though the significance 
abates as the percentage of voting rights increases. Consistent with existing literature, CEO 
ownership and company performance have an inverse relationship. The results of this thesis 
suggest that companies with higher leverage ratios tend to underperform, whilst companies 
with rapid sales growth outperform.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Based on the general fundamentals of finance, the traditional agency theory proposes 
that the separation of ownership and control of a company leads to various agency 
problems among participants in interest. The agency theory is based on premises that 
agents (managers) do business on behalf of a company’s shareholders. This is a typical 
example of agency related problems within the companies (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
managers exacerbate this problem with their opportunistic behaviour as they settle on 
choices at the expense of shareholders’ advantages (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, 
agency related conflicts could be resolved if managers of companies partially owned the 
company they run (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, observing managerial ownership 
within a company is one of the essential factors of corporate performance.  
 
Earlier studies prove that the execution of a company improves when ownership stakes 
are merged through grouping of ownership (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990; Katper, Anand 
& Kazi, 2018). If a company’s ownership structure is not well-diversified, the company 
becomes an acquisition target for external investors. This study forms a comprehensive 
analysis on ownership structure and types by comparing their impact on the financial 
performance of a company, measured by Tobin’s Q. A company’s financial performance 
is one of the key factors to judge the performance of managers (Cheung & Wei, 2006). 
Collecting the financial and accounting data from Nasdaq OMX Helsinki for the period of 
five years, I discover both positive and negative significant results of ownership structure 
with respect to Tobin’s Q. With the inclusion of several control variables, I disclose 
variables that are related to the observed dependent variable, Tobin’s Q. 
 
After the financial crisis, the upward market condition has lasted almost a decade. Now, 
turning into a new decade, it is reasonable to look back and examine changes in 
corporate ownership structures and how these changes have affected the performance 
of companies. The last decade was exceptional in global financial markets. Generally, 
accepted boundaries, general fundamentals of financial theories have changed, and 
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behavioural finance has gained ground. This thesis aims to form an updated point of view 
for the venerable question whether family-owned businesses still play in a dominance 
role and yield greater financial performance compared to other types of ownerships.   
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
This study aims to build a block in understanding of the relationship between ownership 
and corporate performance. While it might seem counterintuitive, the best decision-
maker and owner is not necessarily the person with most successes, but rather the one 
with best processes, judgement, and management. The purpose of the study is to 
crystallize two main point of views, ownership structure and voting power, and their 
separate impact on a company’s financial performance, measured by using the 
relationship between market valuation and intrinsic value, Tobin’s Q. This study 
endeavours to find evidence if a certain type of ownership leads to greater company 
performance, as well as to dispute and confirm earlier studies on the underlying context.  
 
1.2 Contribution of the study 
A growing body of literature (e.g. Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010) 
have examined the association between ownership structure and corporate 
performance, while the geographic concentration has limited mostly to Asia and Middle 
East area, and the United States. As a geographic area, Northern Europe is still quite 
unexplored, and thus an updated research is required in order to increase the full 
understanding of the ownership fundamentals that affect corporate performance. 
Further, earlier academic literature support accounting-based variables, such as ROA and 
ROE in their studies while this study concentrates more on the relationship between 
market valuation and intrinsic value, Tobin’s Q. In this thesis, I follow the stream of the 
literature and touch on an alternative view that the voting rights of major owners within 
a company do have direct (or indirect) relationship with respect to company 
performance, Tobin’s Q. According to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), variations in  
10 
 
ownership structure should not be systematically related to variations in company 
performance. However, this study gives an alternative approach that fluctuations  in
ownership structure has an impact on corporate performance. The paper contributes to 
the existing literature in at least two main ways: firstly, earlier studies are reflected to 
concern on the Northern European geographic area, and secondly, the variables used in 
earlier studies are utilized in the regressions made in this study. Chapter 3.2.2. goes 
through more comprehensively the base literature, and how I utilize these studies in the 
empirical part of the thesis. 
 
1.3 Structure of the study 
The structure of the study is constructed as follows: Chapter 2 presents the theoretical 
framework of the examined subject. It explains comprehensively the fundamental 
factors that form a basis of a company’s ownership structure. Further, it indicates the 
relationship between a company’s most crucial agencies and the possible conflict that 
may occur through their activities. Chapter 3 goes through earlier studies and give an 
overview of a few different studies concerning the divisive topic of ownership structure 
and corporate performance. Chapter 4 presents the data of the study and the descriptive 
statistics as well as the used variables. The research methodology and model 
specifications are presented in chapter 5, while chapter 6 provides the main results of 
the empirical part of the thesis. To give a comprehensive outline of the thesis, chapter 7 
concludes the main findings. 
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2 THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
The academic research of ownership structure and corporate performance extends back 
to the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, Berle and Means (1932) argued that 
the diffusion of a company’s ownership structure has, evidently, a direct relationship to 
corporate performance. The underlying issue states that a company´s management is 
eager to drive their own interest at the expense of the company´s stakeholders. This 
chapter represents the theoretical framework of ownership structure and corporate 
performance. The objective is to give a comprehensive theoretical overview of factors 
that, regarding to the finance theory, affect consistently the behavior of a company and 
its shareholders. Shareholders actively exploit their leverage by participating in a 
company´s decisions and actions, and how a company´s policies should be organized.  
 
The structure of the theoretical perspective is built around the agency theory, firstly 
presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and subsequently reviewed by Fama & Jensen 
(1983) and Eisenhart (1989). According to the finance theory, a company´s aim is to 
maximize the wealth of its shareholders. As corporate efficiency seems to be a 
prominent outcome of well-structured ownership, I also assess the basic overview of the 
theory of corporate performance measurements, overviewed e.g. by Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) and further studied by Margaritis and Psillaki (2010). As scoping the 
study to concern the Nordic area of Europe, corporate governance has an essential 
impact on the behavior of corporations, their boards and shareholders, and hence, need 
to be incorporated to the theoretical review. In addition, I am tying together elements 
of the theory of each ownership types. 
 
2.1 Agency cost theory 
At a market where agency problems are not present, a corporation´s management 
chooses investment opportunities that maximize the wealth of shareholders. Large 
public companies are usually known for atomistic stakeholders and have both dispersed 
and separated ownership and control. (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Even though the conflicts 
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between a company’s debtors, managers, and shareholders are well-recognized in the 
literature, the efficient monitoring and disciplinary of controlling agents can be alleviated 
on account of large shareholders, such as state and pension and insurance companies 
(Andersen & Reeb, 2003). Early on the 1970’s, Jensen and Meckling (1976) have 
presented the foundation of the agency cost theory which states the underlying conflict 
that a company´s management does not deal with shareholders´ wealth with the same 
essential vigilance with which, for instance, consistent (family business) top 
management does. The agency cost theory is based on the idea that the interests of a 
company´s management and its shareholders are not completely aligned. This leads to 
the unfavourable condition where both parties seek to maximize their own utility, and if 
their interests are not aligned, there is a possibility that certain agents might act on their 
own behalf. A Company´s management is faced with both positive and negative 
incentives to assure that it obeys objectives that maximize shareholder wealth. (Jensen 
& Meckling 1976.)  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) separate agency costs between the principals and the 
agents into three different categories: monitoring expenditures, bonding expenditures, 
and residual loss. The principal has a possibility to restrict dispersion from his/her 
interest by creating adequate incentives for agents and by causing monitoring costs 
planned to restrict the deviant activities of agents (bonding expenditures). Moreover, in 
some cases the principal can guarantee that agents do not set out specific action which 
could harm the principal or, vice versa, concede relieves in a way that agents do such an 
action (monitoring expenditures). Lastly, the residual loss can be referred to the cost of 
agency relationship in where agents set out specific actions which have a 
disadvantageous impact on the principal´s interest. (Jensen & Meckling 1976.) Further 
sections concern the isolation of an agency cost of equity and debt which is essential in 
order to ease the understanding of the relationship between principals and agents.
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2.1.1 Separation of ownership and risk-bearing functions 
For decades, companies have tried to survive from the outgoing competition. 
Organizations´ operating model is premised on a nexus of explicit contracts among 
groups of interest. These agreements identify positions, rights and responsibilities of 
agents in the organization, and define profit functions, incentives and performance 
indicators. Essentially, a company´s shareholders are entitled to residual claim, even 
though the magnitude of it remains vague. Further, Fama and Jensen (1983) determine 
the risk incorporated into the residual claim as the divergence between the uncertain 
cash inflows and defined cash outflows allocated to manage a business. The one that 
delivers services and products at the lowest price while covering costs, succeeds. The 
circulation of competition among organizations obeys Charles Darwin´s evolution theory 
– the frailest disappear, the most robust govern. Both failure and success are 
incorporated into the discussion where one of the fundamental features is the 
separation of decisions and control. (Fama & Jensen 1983.) 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the most influential agents, such as top management, 
should not bear a significant portion of the financial impact on their decisions. The 
allocation of decision process among an organization´s agents is in an important role in 
order to explain the survival of an organization. Typically, the decision process is divided 
into two specific categories – decision management and decision control. Under 
decision management, implementation and initiation are allotted to the same decision 
agents, while decision control consists of the monitoring and ratifying of decisions 
carried out by the shareholders or their representatives on the board of a company. 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983.) These components form the generalized steps of the decision 
process which is illustrated in the figure below: 
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Figure 1. The Decision Process. (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
 
Advantages one gains from the separation of ownership and control depend on the 
characteristics of a company. Hence, optimization and control of agencies in the decision 
process are not always clear. It is worth examining whether these three functions – 
decision management, decision control and residual claims – can be allocated to the 
same agent. For instance, in family businesses where ownership and control are highly 
concentrated on one agent or specific agents, and functions are hard to allocate within 
the company, decision management and decision control are most convenient to be 
handled by the major (controlling) agent. This is usually appropriate in a non-complex 
company where relevant information for decision-making is concentrated only in a 
couple of agents. In such situations, the major owner bears the risk, residual claim1,  that 
the agent uses his/her power in the company. To prevent this from occurring, the major 
owners of a company can allocate a specific portion of the residual claim to other agents 
to keep his/her own interest aligned with others. An example of the situation is equity 
shareholders of a joint stock company where shareholders are entitled to a share of the 
 
1 Residual claim refers to the shareholders’ right to the leftover assets of a company once all the fixed 
claims that are tied to business activities are acknowledged. Since the shareholders are owners, they are 
entitled to a vis-à-vis share of any leftover value. 
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residual claim on grounds of an agreement. In large companies, the separation of 
decision management and control is usually wider since the decision-making and 
ownership structures are more complex. (Fama & Jensen 1983.) 
 
2.1.2 Agency cost of external equity 
Small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) dominate the market economies in 
quantitative terms – in Finland, the share of SMEs is over 90 %. Usually, in such 
companies the ownership and control are concentrated only in one or a few agents. A 
single owner owns and controls for 100 percent of the residual claims on a company and 
his/her aim is to maximize the company´s value, in other words, to make profit for 
him/herself. If he/she remains as the owner of the company, specific information and 
knowledge is on-time and all interests are aligned without the occurrence of agency 
problems. (Singh & Davidson, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976.) However, if the owner 
chooses to broaden the ownership of the company, for instance, by selling shares to an 
external investor or blockholder agency costs may arise. Then, as the ownership is 
decentralized, the owner of the company won´t bear maximum cost and risk that are, 
from the perspective of shareholders, associated with value destroying activities. 
Because of an external equity, the owner´s portion of ownership in the company falls, 
and so does the marginal cost of expropriation. As a result, his/her possibility and 
willingness of using the company’s capital decreases. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976.) 
 
2.1.3 Conflicts between minority and controlling shareholders 
According to previous studies2, large controlling shareholders form a basis of publicly 
traded companies in most countries. Frequently, these large controlling shareholders 
own considerably more control rights than cash flow rights. Consequently, there is a risk-
bearing function that the major controlling shareholders try to exploit their private gain 
 
2 See e.g. Holderness, C. G., & Sheehan, D. P. (1988). The role of majority shareholders in publicly held 
corporations: An exploratory analysis. Journal of financial economics, 20, 317-346., and Claessens, S., 
Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., & Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large 
shareholdings. The journal of finance, 57(6), 2741-2771. 
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at the expense of minority shareholders. According to Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003), a 
controlling minority structure may cause large agency costs. This kind of structure 
combines multiple agency problem issues, such as a company that is controlled by an 
insider who owns a pro rata share of a company’s equity or a company that is controlled 
by an insider who is separated from the impact of other shareholders and corporate 
control market. (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003.)  
 
In large corporations, monitoring and controlling is efficiently arranged. However, 
corporations’ policies may create disadvantageous circumstance for minority 
shareholders. There are numerous different conflicts between a company’s major and 
minor shareholders, such as pay-out policies or redistribution of income done by a 
company’s top management. Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) provide a theoretical 
approach which suggests that a tight control by a company’s largest shareholders forms 
a threat of expropriation among shareholders which deducts management initiatives 
and investments that are non-contractible. Moreover, Burkart, et. al (1997) examine that 
a company’s ownership concentration may have an impact on incentive schemes, 
especially performance-based, and thus possible conflicts can arise.  
 
2.1.4 Conflicts between shareholders and debt claimants 
Another potential conflict between principals and agents can arise between 
shareholders and debt claimants. The underlying issue refers to the incentives of risk-
shifting and asset substitutions. In such a case, wealth is being expropriated by 
shareholders at the expense of debt claimants by investing capital in more risky 
initiations and projects compared to those currently held in a company´s portfolio. 
Consequently, a company´s shareholders realize most of the high-risk payoffs whereas 
debt claimants bear most of costs. (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983.) 
Alternatively, the possible agency conflict can arise in option-pricing framework. For 
instance, shareholders may benefit from different equity holdings, e.g. call options, by 
exercising options in a state where the value of the asset is in its peak – greater than the 
debt claim. While the company risk increases, the value of the callable option increases 
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and, therefore, causes the downward valuation of the debt claim. (Anderson, Mansi & 
Reeb, 2003.) 
 
Commonly, debt claimants require different kinds of covenants and monitoring devices 
to obviate any risk-shifting problems which occur because of shareholders´ incentives 
that appeal from external debt. However, the cost-benefit ratio of such shareholder-
monitoring is inadequate. Moreover, all the future contingencies are not possible to 
perceive, and thus, inevitably some contracts cannot be made out. There are plenty of 
covenants that can monitor for, for instance, leverage-based financing, lease or dividend 
restrictions, and mergers and acquisitions. Still, some covenants are more difficult to 
monitor and regulate, such as managers´ intentions to invest in high-cost and negative 
NPV projects. As a result of this, the agency costs increase, and hence the premiums 
required by debt claimants increase. Obviously, this kind of conflicts between debt 
claimants and shareholders lead to the upward cost of debt. (Anderson, et al., 2003.) 
 
2.1.5 Reduction of agency costs 
The theory of agency cost refers to the fact that a company´s management pursues to 
fulfil its own goals instead of maximizing the wealth of shareholders. This agency relation 
between principals and agents may have a value-destroying effect. There are several 
procedures to reduce agency costs. For example, according to Rozeff (1982), a 
company´s dividend pay-out policy and reduction of managerial ownership may have a 
reducing impact on agency costs. Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) assume that the 
pay-out of cash dividends obliges a company to operate in the capital markets more 
often, and hence leads to the reduction of agency costs as monitoring and controlling 
increase. Moreover, if a top management’s and shareholders’ interests are well-aligned, 
it can lead to the reduction of agency costs (Jensen & Meckling 1976). 
 
Rozeff (1982) argues that a top management´s stock ownership and dividend pay-out 
policy are counterfactual tools to reduce agency costs between parties of conflict. 
Usually, corporations that use high-level management stock ownership to reduce agency 
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costs pay lower dividend to shareholders, whereas corporations with lower 
management stock ownership tend to have higher dividend pay-out ratios. Inversely, at 
some point, as the increase in stock ownership rises, it has an upward impact on agency 
costs. As a company´s management increases its ownership in the company stock, it 
leads to the fact that managers become less diversified than other shareholders. Hence, 
projects with a higher company risk may be rejected, although projects are justified 
based on the forecasted cash flows and total systematic risk. (Rozeff, 1982; Aljifri, 
Alzarouni, Chew & Tahir, 2014.)  
 
2.1.6 Role of the board 
In corporations, internal controlling is assigned to the board. The board of a company 
represents shareholders, monitors and ratifies actions of a company´s management, 
accepts compensation structures across a company. The shareholders of a company 
select the board members yearly in annual general meeting, and hence interests are 
usually aligned within these parties. Still, there may arise conflicts that can lead to 
operational inefficiency. 
 
The relationship between corporate performance (Tobin´s Q) and managerial ownership 
is well-documented. For instance, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) investigate that the 
ownership of the board of directors and the company value seem to have a non-
monotonic3 relationship, if measured by Tobin's Q. Interestingly, McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) provide an evidence that the relationship between Tobin´s Q and managerial 
stock ownership is curvilinear.  
 
Fama & Jensen (1983) argue that to enhance the sharing of valuable specific information 
of an organization´s activities and to increase the performance of monitoring, the CEO 
of a company is usually included in the board of a company. Nowadays, due to the rising 
 
3 Non-monotonic relationship refers to the condition where an increase in one variable leads to a decrease 
in another. 
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vigilance of corporate compliance and governance the discussion whether CEO should 
be included in a company’s board has come up (Platt & Platt, 2012). The hierarchy within 
a company needs to be well-defined between the main authorities – the board members 
and top management. The lack of hierarchy levels may decrease an ability to make more 
objective decisions and raise the risk of firing the management. (Fama & Jensen, 1983.) 
 
2.1.7 Corporate governance environment in the Nordics 
The regulations of corporate governance have become more aligned during the last 
decade. The underlying reasons for this alignment could be found from the development 
of homogenous financial markets and corporate ownership. To encourage companies to 
further globalization, the new regulations are natural continuum for the development. 
Especially in the European area, European Union has taken a huge role of vanguard when 
it comes to aligning regulations to the international operational environment. The global 
adjustment of regulations has had a huge impact on the international commerce, owing 
to the Anglo-American system that has been a role model for EU regulators. 
Consequently, these regulation reforms have brought European countries closer to the 
British corporate governance system. (Jakobsson & Korkeamäki, 2014.) 
 
An explanation of moving towards the Anglo-American governance system stems from 
the fact that these countries play a leading role in the financial markets. Yet, when 
comparing the corporate governance systems between these Anglo-American countries 
and, for instance, Scandinavian countries, one can notice that they differ significantly. 
The lack of disperse ownership and managerial leadership is intrinsic for the Nordic 
countries, such as Finland and Sweden. Rather, in the Nordic countries controlling 
ownership plays a huge role in corporate governance actions. In the United States, it is 
distinctive that a company’s management owns and controls for corporations, whereas 
in the United Kingdom the members of the board control for a company’s actions. 
According to Jakobsson and Korkeamäki (2014), the  regulatory  framework which Anglo-
American companies have adopted does not work as such in Scandinavian countries 
where management controlling is not generally accepted. Even though the Anglo-
 20  
American corporate governance model has impacted positively on the Scandinavian 
system, it has contributed to problems in our corporate governance and ethical 
framework, such as the legal entitlement provided for the board and the behavioural 
change towards company management ownership and controlling power. (Jakobsson & 
Korkeamäki 2014.) 
 
2.2 Features of ownership types 
According to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), ownership can be defined as a proportion 
of shares of a company held and owned by a person, institution or some authority that 
entitles the owner of these shares to certain rights and obligations within the company. 
The essential feature of ownership is ownership concentration which refers to at least 
one shareholder who owns and controls for a significant number of shares in a company. 
The major shareholder can be, for instance, a government, a foundation, an institution, 
some other corporation, a foreign investor, or a family. A company´s major shareholders 
have an essential role in a company´s functions as they monitor and ratify the actions of 
the management. For one shareholder, a marginal cost of monitoring can be much less 
than for another. The degree of contribution to management decisions have a linear 
relationship with the increasing power of ownership. (Rubin, 2007.) The following 
chapters gives a comprehensive representation of these features of ownership types, 
their characteristics, and incentives as shareholders.  
 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that ownership concentration is an essential part of the 
corporate governance mechanism through which agency problems arising from 
ownership and control can be reduced. Accordingly, the hypothesis of positive corporate 
performance with concentrated ownership is based on its effective monitoring. The basis 
of ownership concentration is that a company´s major shareholders can actively 
influence, control and discipline the management decision-making in order to protect 
their own interests. Previous studies (Nguyen, Locke & Reddy, 2015; Rubin, 2007;  Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) examine that ownership concentration is closely attached to 
corporate performance, and if managed effectively, it mitigates agency problems. Not 
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only in developed countries the impact of monitoring is playing an essential role due to 
the restrictive regulation standards but also in underdeveloped markets where the 
magnitude of external governance is less standardized. There, major shareholders are 
forced to monitor companies´ top management due to the absence of external 
managerial discipline. That is possible and effective only if ownership is concentrated 
within the company. In contrast to positive association with performance and ownership 
concentration, the negative predictions of ownership concentration are based on its 
expropriation effect. If ownership is highly concentrated, the agency problems may 
convert to principal-principal conflicts from traditional principal-agent conflicts. This may 
lead to the upward conflict between minority and controlling shareholders. (Nguyen et. 
al, 2015.) 
 
Early on 1980s, Demsetz (1983) argued that ownership structure is an endogenous 
value-maximization process of shareholders. Based on that definition, the main 
argumentation is that the variations in a company´s ownership structure should not be 
systematically associated with the variations in corporate performance. The dynamic 
nature of the relationship between corporate governance structure and corporate 
performance implies that a company´s past performance is connected with the present 
corporate governance structure. Hence, it is essential to examine different ownership 
types and their features. The following chapters introduce more deeply the features of 
different ownership types – state, institution, foreign, family, and corporation ownership 
types.  
 
2.2.1 State ownership 
State ownership has had essential consequences for financial and economic 
development around the world. States control a significant proportion of companies, 
especially the largest ones (Faccio & Lang, 2002). The reasons for state ownership can 
be divided into different categories such as citizen protection, securing of basic services,  
or increased competition. According to La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002), 
such ownership tends to be common in countries with low per capita income (PCI), 
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slowly emerging market economies, and poorly managed governments. However, 
especially emerging market economy countries have started the privatization of state-
owned enterprises. This kind of action is in contradiction with the fact that the state is 
one of the biggest owners, measured by the capital tied to stock market, among the 
publicly listed companies in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki stock exchange (Prime Minister’s 
Office, 2020). State-owned companies are characterised by sustaining society´s welfare, 
as well as pursuing political and social goals, such as redistribution of wealth, instead of 
maximizing profits. Yet, the justification of state ownership and its benefits for societies 
remain controversial. (Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001.)  
 
2.2.2 Institutional ownership 
Institutional ownership refers to the fraction of ownership in a certain company that is 
held by large entities such as financial organizations, foundation, insurance companies 
or mutual and pension funds. Generally, institutional investors purchase a large amount 
of a company´s outstanding shares and become major blockholders. Through this, 
institutional investors can have a significant influence on the decision-making of a 
company´s management. Various studies4 argue that institutional investors participate 
in the enhancement of a company´s performance by supporting and monitoring 
managers in different kind of amendments, such as duties of a company´s directors when 
a company is targeted with a possible takeover bid. The difference between traditional 
controlling corporate owners and institutional investors is that for institutions an 
ownership has primarily one objective, maximizing the return on investment (ROI). 
(Duggal & Millar, 1999.)  
 
Institutions are rather passive than active investors and usually diversify their 
investments in multiple securities. However, institutions may decide to expand their  
strategies towards more active participation. For instance, some large hedge or mutual 
funds are well-known for managerial entrenchment strategies that affiliate with active 
 
4 See for example: Pound (1988), Brickley, et. al (1988), and Agrawal & Mandelker (1990). 
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participation to maximize capital gains. For instance, Nesbitt (1994), and Smythe, McNeil 
and English (2015) give an example of institutional investor activism by using California 
Public Employee Retirement System5 (CalPERS-effect) as a proxy. Nesbitt (1994) finds out 
that companies that are targeted to the CalPERS outperform Standard & Poor index by 
almost 50 % over the subsequent five-year period. Even though Smythe, et. al (2015) 
examine positive abnormal announcement returns, they notice only a little 
enhancement in value adding measurements. 
 
The venerable assumption is that institutional investors operate in efficient capital 
markets, and because of the magnitude of their investments, their activities may 
improve market efficiency. There are a couple of point of views from which one could 
approach institutional investors. Firstly, institutional investors are risk pooling providers 
for smaller investors. Their objective is to concentrate on liquidity and diversification, 
and hence they prefer relatively large and liquid capital markets in order to manage to 
adjust their holdings in response to new information. Secondly, because of effective 
pooling methods, institutional investors usually are the major blockholders in a large 
corporation. In large institutions, influence plays an essential role in monitoring a 
company´s management activities, and hence it has a positive long-term effect on a 
corporate governance within a company. (Davis & Steil, 2004: 13.) 
 
2.2.3 Foreign ownership 
Foreign owners have become a major part of the ownership diversification in the global 
market economies. Globalization has provoked international ownership in companies. 
Especially, the harmonization of European Union regulations has led to the increase of 
reign ownership across the continent. According to a statistical comparison, foreign-
 
5 See more about CalPERS-effect: Nelson, J. M. (2006). The “CalPERS effect” revisited again. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 12(2), 187-213 and Barber, B. M. (2007). Monitoring the monitor: Evaluating CalPERS' 
activism. The Journal of Investing, 16(4), 66-80. 
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owned companies hold a significant portion of businesses in the Nordic countries. 
Because of the active role of multinational corporations, large domestic companies are 
particularly foreign-owned. A significant part of foreign ownership comes from 
neighbouring countries. In 2018, the amount of foreign ownership in Nasdaq OMX 
Helsinki was about 120 billion euros. Foreign ownership has grown sharply during the 
1990’s in the Nordic countries. (Euroclear 20186; Jakobsson & Korkeamäki, 2014.)  
 
There are two prevailing types of foreign ownerships. First and the most traditional way 
is that foreign investors hold a proportion of shares of a company. Secondly, a company 
can be acquired by a foreign investor, and as a result of this, the acquired company is 
taken out from the public stock exchange. If a company becomes acquired, it typically 
becomes a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign company. However, after the acquisition 
the company can be traded in another foreign stock exchange. According to Finnish 
Jakobsson and Korkeamäki (2014), the potential profitability and productivity gains are 
significant as specialization throughout the cross-border acquisitions usually increases 
rapidly. Ylä-Anttila, Ali-Yrkkö and Nyberg (2004) examine that international acquisitions 
have a positive impact on target companies and that foreign byers contribute to the 
profitability of the target company.  
 
Also, foreign ownership can be viewed as a strategy of portfolio diversification. In this 
case, a foreign investor only holds a limited proportion of shares, and thus does not have 
major controlling ownership, and usually a foreign investor stays in a passive relationship 
with a company.  
 
2.2.4 Family ownership 
To create a successful company, it requires comprehensive knowledge of industry and 
strong innovative mindset. Through these, some exceptional family business stories can 
 
6 Euroclear Finland is an institution that manages the functionality of the book-entry system and tasks 
related to it in Finland.  
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be born, such as Walmart, one of the biggest multinational retail corporations holding 
11 695 stores worldwide with the revenue of 500 billion. (Walmart Annual Report, 2018.)  
 
According to earlier literature (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006), family companies 
are found to outperform companies whose ownership is more decentralized. The 
underlying reason for this outperformance may be linked with the corporate governance 
model which is unique in family businesses. As a family owns and controls for a major 
proportion of shares of a company, it mitigates the classical agency problems that might 
occur otherwise. Yet, the downside of family control is noticeable. The temptation of 
using resources and controlling possibilities carelessly puts a company´s minority 
shareholders in a disadvantageous position. Thus, it has been argued that the limitation 
of top management positions only to family members may potentially lead to 
competitive disadvantages compared to non-family businesses. (McVey & Draho, 2005.)  
 
The definition of a family business fluctuates, depending on the sorting measurements 
that are used during research. The most essential factors that need to take under 
consideration are the proportion of shares controlled by a founding-family and the 
separation of voting and cash-flow rights. Moreover, one other important point of view 
is a top management´s involvement and relationship with the founding-family. It is worth 
examining whether, for instance, a company has non-family executives, and whether a 
family is still an active part of the board. (McVey & Draho, 2005.) 
 
McVey and Draho (2005) examine that family businesses have managed to outperform 
compared to non-family businesses, measured in terms of Return on Assets (ROA). There 
are a few underlying arguments to support the results, in addition to the corporate 
governance model. The practical knowledge and versatile experience of the business, 
well-planned investment horizons, reputation and both long-lasting and valuable 
relationships with a company´s shareholders are factors that may lead to higher 
expected returns. The mentioned benefits and drawbacks highly depend on the 
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founding-family´s eagerness to reduce their control if it is not aligned with the purpose 
of serving its shareholders. (McVey & Draho, 2005.) 
 
2.2.5 Corporate ownership 
Corporate (equity) ownership is an ownership arrangement where one corporation 
holds a major share of another corporation’s shares outstanding. Such ownership can be 
arranged in several ways, for instance through dual class shares, takeover or buyout. 
Even though the methods of arrangements differ widely, the purpose of corporate equity 
ownership is usually categorized based on two points of view: synergy and scale 
advantages through which a company can enhance its capability to increase capital gains 
and market share. Moreover, corporate ownership may be in line with a company’s long-
term strategy to expand its business or concentrate more on certain segments or niches. 
(Fee, Hadlock & Thomas, 2006.) 
 
2.2.6 Role of private equity 
The common feature of equity investment is risk. Thus, the expected return, 
compensation, for this type of investment must be higher than what the investor could 
get from a less risky investment, such as interest for a loan. Private equity firms make 
such equity investments in both unlisted and listed firms. Through these investments, 
and especially through the voting rights attached to invested equity, private equity firms 
can discipline a target company´s management, they have the right to return on their 
investments and the right to sell their holdings in a company to some third party.   
 
In Finland, a large proportion of these risk-bearing investments concentrates on unlisted 
companies. According to Jakobsson and Korkeamäki (2014), venture capital deals can be 
divided into three different segments: (1) Early stage investments are usually made into 
high growth prospects, relatively young companies whose business is highly dependent  
on the invested capital, (2) growth stage where the main objective is to expedite a target 
company´s growth, fund acquisitions or increase liquidity, and (3) re-structuring stage of 
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mature companies where private equity funds usually invest to financial distress 
companies by the means of new equity in order to restructure and take control of a 
company. (Jakobsson & Korkeamäki, 2014.)
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES FORMULATION  
This thesis proposes a novel approach to ownership structure and corporate 
performance in the Nordic countries, specifically in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. The structure 
of the thesis is reflected to previous studies which concentrate strongly on the robust 
relationship between ownership and corporate performance. Firstly, this chapter gives 
an overview on the base literature and present profoundly earlier research which are 
closely attached to the subject of this study. The following studies have shown a major 
role in the academic research of ownership structure and corporate performance, and 
for this reason I also select these studies as base studies. Secondly, during this chapter 
the main hypotheses of this study are developed.  
 
3.1 Maury  
The article “Family ownership and firm performance: Empirical evidence from Western 
European corporations” by Benjamin Maury (2006) examines whether companies with 
non-family controlling shareholders outperform companies with family controlling 
shareholders in Western Europe. Earlier studies suggest that companies with founding-
family ownership tend to outperform companies with widely held ownership for the 
reasons of higher company valuation and reduction of agency costs between owners and 
managers. Contradictory, agency problems may arise in the family-owned businesses 
due to conflicts between the family and minority shareholders.   
  
The study concentrates on Western European corporations. The data sample is 
constructed of 1672 companies excluding financials and by utilizing Faccio and Lang´s 
(2002) ultimate ownership data and the WorldScope database. The selected countries 
are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. To guarantee robustness, financial firms 
are studied separately from the main data sample. 
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To investigate the relationship between ownership structure and financial performance 
of Western European corporations, the study uses a country fixed-effects specification, 
Lagrange multiplier test, which is supported by Breusch and Pagan (1980). The main 
analysis includes the estimation of three different performance indicators, Return on 
Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), and Tobin’s Q. 
 
In this study, the author uses several industry and firm-specific controlling variables. The 
selected variables are growth in net sales, capital expenditures (CAPEX), and total debt 
divided by total capital. Moreover, the study includes dummy variables such as two-digit 
SIC codes to control for industry effects, ownership dummy to control for the largest 
controlling shareholders, such as family, whether an observed company is listed or non-
listed, and an approach where the controlling ownership is family or non-family. Also, 
the author examines the structure of the board of a company by adding dummy variable 
if the CEO of a company belongs to founding-family.  
 
Empirical evidence suggests that family companies outperform companies controlled by 
more expanded ownership. Evidently, Tobin´s Q under control of founding-family 
increases by almost 10 % compared to non-family controlling companies. In addition, 
Maury finds that ROA as a performance metric is over 15 % higher within family 
companies than nonfamily companies. 
 
3.2 Faccio and Lang  
The ultimate ownership of Western European companies by Faccio and Lang (2002) aims 
to answer the questions of what the determinants of ownership structures in Western 
European companies are, and in what ways the owners of a company can take advantage 
of control rights along with ownership rights. To form an examination, the authors gather 
data from over 5 000 listed European companies from 13 different countries. 
Interestingly, the authors include financial companies into the data sample even though 
governmental regulations might impact on their financial performance substantially. 
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They form thresholds for controlling and cash-flow rights to divide the data more 
specifically.   
 
By reflecting previous studies, Faccio and Lang collect the data sample from 5 232 listed 
companies in 13 countries including Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The 
authors use several different data sources to collect the sample, such as Datastream, 
local stock exchanges, and Worldscope. Over the sample period of the study, the authors 
screen out 167 companies that do not have specific ownership structure recorded. The 
study by Faccio and Lang aims to form an extensive understanding of ownership types 
and structures in Western European companies. The authors construct three different 
thresholds, 10, 15, and 20%, to capture more accurate determinants of cash-flow and 
controlling rights. By the perspective of controlling rights, these thresholds are also 
utilized in the study of ownership structure and corporate performance in Nasdaq OMX 
Helsinki.  
 
The authors state a couple of different arguments why ownership and control rights can 
differ within a certain company. Firstly, the difference between cash-flow (ownership) 
and control rights can originate from the fact that companies can issue shares that 
provide different voting rights for certain cash-flow rights. A typical example of different 
voting and cash-flow rights is a dual class share which entitles shareholders to increase 
their voting rights while cash-flow rights remain the same.  Secondly, the difference may 
arise from holdings and pyramiding through multiple chains of control. In the case of  
holdings, a certain owner controls the company via a group of control chains each of 
which has at least 5% of the voting rights at each chain. Pyramiding refers to a situation 
where a certain company has an ultimate owner, who, at the same time, controls 
another company indirectly through a third party that the owner does not totally control. 
For instance, if a foreign entity owns 15% of the company X that owns 20% of the 
company Y, thus the company Y is said to be controlled through pyramiding, at 10% 
threshold. Faccio and Lang divide ownership types into six different categories: families, 
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widely held financial institutions, state, widely held corporations, crossholdings, and 
miscellaneous.  
 
The main findings of “The Ultimate Controlling Owners of Western European 
Corporations” suggest that, at the 20% threshold level, widely held institutions and 
corporations, and families are the most important ownership types in all countries 
resulting 36,93% and 44,29%, respectively. Nonetheless, there is a fluctuation between 
continental Europe and the United Kingdom, as widely held companies in the UK and 
Ireland result 63,08% and 62,32%, respectively, but in continental Europe, Northern 
European countries, i.e. Sweden, Norway and Finland, result highest percentages 
39,18%, 36,77%, and 28,68%, respectively. The main argument of the results is that 
family-owned businesses seem to dominate the ownership field in all examined 
European countries.  
 
3.3 Anderson and Reeb 
The study  “Founding-family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 
500” by Anderson and Reeb (2003) aims to answer the questions whether family-owned 
businesses outperform non-family owned businesses, a certain ownership type affects 
corporate performance more, a family member as a CEO has a significant, positive or 
negative, impact on corporate performance, and how younger companies perform  
compared to mature companies. The study is crucial to include into the review of 
literature as it concerns the companies of Standard & Poors 500 in the United States.  
 
The authors state that the public U.S. companies are usually less efficient and less 
profitable than other types of ownerships, yet this cannot be viewed as a universal norm.  
Family-owned businesses constitute a large portion (over 35%) of the Standard & Poors 
500 Industrials, owning almost 20% of their companies’ outstanding equity. According 
to Anderson and Reeb, a family member as a CEO results a positive relationship with 
respect to accounting profitability measures, ROA and ROE. Also, the authors include 
Tobin’s Q which reports negative impact on corporate performance when the CEO is a 
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member of the founding family. A single argument for this relationship could be found, 
according to the authors, from the fact that poorly performed family companies more 
likely sell their portion and exit the company.   
 
For this study, the authors use a data sample collected from 403 companies in the 
Standard & Poors 500 from 1992 to 1999, which totally includes 2 713 firm-years. The 
dataset has been collected manually from COMPUSTAT Industrial Files. Similarly, as in 
the ownership and corporate performance study from Nasdaq OMX Helsinki, the authors 
exclude financial companies and public entities since the calculus of Tobin’s Q becomes 
more difficult due to the various regulations that may have an impact on corporate value.  
From the whole dataset, family-owned businesses play a dominant role, since 72% of SIC 
codes in S&P 500 are addressed to family businesses. 
 
Primarily, the authors focus on the identification of family companies. To illustrate 
whether a certain company belongs to the family-owned category, the authors use the 
fractional equity ownership of the founding family and examine whether there are family 
members in the board of the company. The main interest of the authors is how founding-
family ownership impact on corporate performance. The examination is done by using 
multivariate analysis, which incorporates variables that identify whether CEO belongs to 
founding-family or not. The authors use a fixed effects method to run a multiple 
regression. The fixed effects are indicated as dummy variables for each year of the 
sample. Also, SIC codes are marked as dummy variables.  
 
The authors find out that family-owned companies perform significantly better than 
non-family-owned companies, as measured by ROA. This argument is contrary to the 
earlier hypothesis that, in the US, family-owned businesses are less efficient and 
profitable. Also, Anderson and Reeb state that a CEO from the founding family generates 
greater profitability than a CEO from outside of the family. One possible explanation for 
this could be that family members have a versatile knowledge of the business, and thus 
generate better results than an outsider. By using market valuation measure, Tobin’s Q, 
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the evidence becomes more relevant as family businesses seem to outperform non-
family businesses. 
 
3.4 Formulation of hypotheses 
The fundamental hypothesis for this study stems from the controversial relationship 
between ownership, financial performance, and company value. The earlier literature 
has shown that ownership affects a company’s performance and value. This argument 
originates from the implication that a specific owner type or specific characteristic 
among owners impacts on a company’s performance. The enigma is whether the impact 
is positive or negative. The main statistical hypothesis is formed by presuming that the 
coefficient (β) of the certain ownership variable equals zero. If the coefficient (β) differs  
statistically from zero, the null hypothesis is rejected in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis H1 and then, one can interpret that ownership has an impact on a company’s 
performance.  
       
𝐻0 ∶ 𝛽(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒) = 0 
 
𝐻1 :  𝛽(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒)  ≠ 0 
 
Alternatively, the second hypothesis for this study stems from the relationship of control 
rights of a company (voting power), and corporate performance (Tobin’s Q). Again, as 
with the first hypothesis, the underlying issue lies in the fact whether the impact is 
positive or negative. Hence, by assuming that the coefficient (β) of the certain voting 
right threshold equals zero, we can proceed to hypothesis that if the coefficient (β) 
differs statistically from zero, H0 is rejected in favour of H1 and then, it can be interpreted 
that a certain amount of voting rights has a relationship with a company performance. 
 
𝐻0 ∶  𝛽(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠) = 0 
 
𝐻1 ∶  𝛽(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠)  ≠ 0 
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4 DATA 
The data of this thesis is constructed from two primary data sources, the Orbis database 
and companies’ financial statements and reports, with which the thesis aims to answer 
the question if ownership structure has either upward or downward impact on a 
company´s financial performance. The Orbis database is maintained by Bureau van Dijk 
and consists of massive amount of data information regarding (listed and unlisted) 
companies´ key financial figures, globally approved financial ratios, and other 
information which is highly relevant to guarantee the quality of the results in this thesis. 
The data has been constructed to one Excel file, with all the relevant and cross-checked 
information included. The key dependent and controlling variables, and dummy 
variables are thorough examined during chapter 4. 
 
In this thesis, the focused market segment is Finland, more closely, Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. 
Earlier studies have examined the effects of ownership in financial performance in large 
market economies, such as Asia, East Asia, and the United States. Hence, this thesis 
makes a specific demarcation and concentration on Northern Europe. Data is gathered 
with yearly frequency and it represents absolute values from 2014 to 2018. The 
underlying reason for the 5-year time period is that a number of listed companies has 
increased significantly (>20%) in the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki within this time period, and 
thus it is interesting to investigate the impact of ownership structure on corporate 
performance during the time period.  Also, the upward market condition has led to the 
situation where companies’ ownership structures need to be adjusted into the 
immanent market condition.  
 
Some of the observed companies have been excluded from the data due to the complex 
characteristic of the industry, such as structures of balance sheets and valuation 
approximations that differ substantially, for instance, in financial, real estate, and 
insurance industry. Also, these areas of industries might have certain governmental 
regulations that may have an impact on financial performance, and thus excluding them 
from the main sample is appropriate.
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4.1.1 Dependent variable 
In this thesis, I utilize Tobin’s Q, a forward-looking financial performance indicator, as a 
dependent variable. Tobin´s Q has an important role in many corporate finance 
interactions. Tobin´s Q was originally introduced by James Tobin (1968) who suggest that 
the replacement cost of a company´s total assets equals with the market value of the 
company and that the total market value of the company is a sum of the market value 
of equity and debt. The formula has been further upgraded and examined by several 
studies (Lindenberg & Ross 1981; Chung & Pruitt 1994; Singh, Tabassum & Darwish 2018). 
It is considered as a good-functioning approximation for measuring a company’s 
performance. If Tobin’s Q results less than 1, a company can be considered as 
undervalued in relation to its total assets´ replacement cost. If it results over 1, a 
company seems to be overvalued compared to its replacement cost of total assets.  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 =  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 + 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
, 
 
where the market value of a company is calculated as its market share price multiplied 
by the shares outstanding.  Long-term debt is calculated as a sum of long-term interest 
and non-interest-bearing debt, and the book value of a company´s total assets 
represents the end of a year value of assets during the sample period. 
 
Tobin’s Q has echoed discussion about its usefulness as a proxy for measuring company 
value in situations where the examined company is over- or undervalued. For instance, 
Verbeke and Brugman (2009), and Erickson and Whited (2012) argue that Tobin’s Q is an 
insufficient performance indicator as it assumes that capital markets are efficient, which 
means that a company´s true value can be reflected from its market valuation. As a single 
market performance indicator Tobin’s Q can be seen as a suitable proxy of a company´s  
“truthful” performance, even though the difference between market-based and 
accounting performance indicators might be idiosyncratic for each company. 
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4.1.2 Ownership variables 
One of the main variables in this empirical part is ownership. In this thesis, each 
company’s ownership structure is being examined by utilizing NASDAQ Helsinki 
companies’ financial statements. For publicly listed companies, information of 
ownership structures is public information, and hence a comprehensive investigation of 
how ownership and voting power affect corporate performance is possible to execute. 
 
In this thesis, ownership variables have been divided into seven different groups, 
including Corporation, Family, Foreign, Foundation, Investment advisor, Pension and 
Insurance, and State. The categories are selected purely based on the industry 
classifications of the owners in NASDAQ Helsinki stock exchange. In the first group, 
corporations, there are also cooperation and holding companies included in the 
examined sample. Also, the investment advisor ownership type includes hedge and 
mutual funds. Table 1 specifies different ownership types and example companies in 
Nasdaq OMX Helsinki.  
  
Table 1. The ownership variables, their specifications, and example companies.  
 
To approach ownership types, I have created a dummy variable for each ownership type 
which takes value of 1 if it concerns a certain type of owner, and 0 otherwise. Moreover, 
I have divided ownership based on voting powers into three different groups. The first 
Ownership Specification Example 
Corporation 
The major owner is a corporation, 
cooperation, or a holding company 
Atria Plc, HKScan Plc, Metsä Board 
Plc 
Family 
The major owner is a family, the founder of a 
company or an individual investor 
Efore Plc, Kone Plc, Marimekko Plc 
Foreign The major owner is a foreign entity 
Ramirent Plc, Rapala VMC Plc, 
TietoEVRY Plc 
Foundation 
The major owner is a foundation, institution, 
or similar entity 
Lassila & Tikanoja Plc, Olvi Plc, 
Vaisala Plc 
Investment 
advisor 
The major owner is a hedge or mutual fund 
Exel Composites Plc, Revenio Group 
Plc 
Pension and 
Insurance 
The major owner is a pension or insurance 
company 
Amer Sports Plc, Nokian Renkaat 
Plc 
State The major owner is a state Metso Plc, Neste Plc, Nokia Plc 
 37  
group includes owners that have most voting power within the company as measured 
by percentage of voting rights, the second group consists of owners that have second 
most voting power within the company, and the third group which includes owners that 
have third most voting power within the company. With this approach, I can divide these 
three groups to subgroups − over 10%, over 15%, and over 20% − in order to measure 
whether more voting power impacts more on corporate performance. In addition to the 
voting rights of owners, I include a CEO ownership variable, which is replicated from 
Maury and Pajuste (2005), to expand the research. Based on earlier literature (Griffith, 
1999; Kim & Lu, 2011), the CEO ownership is expected to have an inverse relationship 
with corporate performance. The more the CEO owns of a company, the less significant 
is an increase in corporate value.  
 
4.1.3 Controlling variables 
I have selected four different controlling variables that are used for explaining variation 
in the examined dependent variable, Tobin’s Q. The underlying reason for selecting these 
variables is based on the articles from Maury (2006), Maury and Pajuste (2005), and  
Anderson and Reeb (2003) where the authors have examined empirically how ownership 
impacts on financial performance of a company. By utilizing these studies, I have selected 
asset tangibility, leverage, sales growth, and size as controlling variables which are 
presented in this part of the chapter. At the end of the chapter, there is a summary 
statistic of selected variables, category of variables, predicted signs and source of data. 
 
Asset tangibility 
 
Asset tangibility is closely related to a company’s capital structure and external financing, 
and thus it also plays an important role when discussing about the ownership structure 
of a certain company. Crucially, asset tangibility itself may determine whether a company 
faces credit constraints - companies with more tangible assets may have greater access 
to external funds. This implies that the relationship between capital spending and cash 
flows is non-monotonic in a company’s asset tangibility. 
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Assets that are more tangible sustain more external financing because tangibility 
mitigates contractibility problems - asset tangibility increases the value that can be 
recaptured by creditors in default states. In the earlier academic results, there are 
different point of views how asset tangibility affects company performance. According 
to Almeida and Campello (2007), companies with very tangible assets are likely to 
become unconstrained. This implies a non-monotonic effect of tangibility on investment-
cash flow sensitivities. On the contrary, Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) examine a positive 
correlation with asset tangibility and leverage, and company performance. Thus, the 
expected outcome of this variable is hard to predict in this data sample.  
 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Dummy variables 
 
Industry dummies have been included to account for the characteristics of different 
industries. The industry divisions are based on SIC codes and includes seven different 
categories: Construction, Manufacturing, Mining, Retail, Service, Transportation, and 
Wholesale. Also, votes over 10 %, 15 % and 20 %, and ownership types are considered 
as dummy variables in the main regression. 
 
Leverage 
 
Already in the 1970’s, Jensen and Meckling (1976) have investigated a direct relationship 
of leverage and corporate efficiency. Leverage is a ratio that is widely used in earlier 
similar studies such as Margaritis & Psillaki (2010). They argue that the impact of 
leverage is negative to company performance, especially in high leverage levels. Yet, for 
this data sample, it is hard to predict the sign of an impact before executing the 
regression. Leverage of a company is calculated as a long-term debt divided by total 
assets. 
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𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =  
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
Sales growth 
 
Sales growth is simply defined as the year-on-year sales growth. Depending on the 
industry structure, sales growth may provide additional market power which companies 
can use to increase performance. Hence, it is expected that sales growth influences 
positively on corporate performance. 
 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ = % 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡 12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 
 
Size 
 
Size, measured as total assets of a company, is a key factor when examining capital and 
ownership structure, and corporate performance. I have selected total assets as a size 
factor instead of total sales as balance sheet (book value) shows more accurately the 
development of a company’s valuation. Thus, in this thesis a simple equation is utilized: 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 
 
 40  
 
Table 2. The variables, categories, predicted signs, and sources of data.  
 
Variable  Category Predicted sign Source of data 
Tobin's Q Dependent variable  Orbis 
Votes % Independent variable + / - Financial statement 
Votes over 10 % Independent variable + / - Financial statement 
Votes over 15 % Independent variable + / - Financial statement 
Votes over 20 % Independent variable + / - Financial statement 
CEO ownership % Independent variable - Financial statement 
Corporation Independent variable + / - Financial statement 
Family Independent variable + Financial statement 
Foreign Independent variable - Financial statement 
Foundation Independent variable + / - Financial statement 
Investment advisor Independent variable +  Financial statement 
Pension and Insurance Independent variable + Financial statement 
State Independent variable  - Financial statement 
Asset tangibility Controlling variable + / - Orbis 
Leverage Controlling variable + / - Orbis 
Sales growth Controlling variable + Orbis 
Size Controlling variable + / - Orbis 
 
Notes: The predicted signs are based on earlier research of ownership structure and corporate 
performance, and writer's own assumptions. 
 
4.2 Descriptive Data 
In this chapter of the thesis, a descriptive data and statistics are presented. This review 
encases an examination of ownership distributions starting from the largest ownership 
to the third largest ownership, industry distribution, summary statistics of Nasdaq OMX 
Helsinki, a normality test to ensure robustness of the thesis, and at the end, a discussion 
of the presented data, including outlier detection, and endogeneity and survivorship bias. 
The final sample of data includes 89 companies which are all listed in Nasdaq OMX 
Helsinki. There are some industry related specifics, for instance, companies within 
financial, real estate or insurance industry that are excluded from the data sample due 
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to the complex structures of balance sheets and governmental regulations. Due to the 
limited time frame of the data, I have been forced to do some adjustments to the data  
sample. Attached, there is a list of companies that are excluded from the data sample 
because they have been unlisted through an acquisition or bankruptcy or a company’s 
industry is not appropriate for this study. Totally, the final data sample includes 8010 
observations from 2014 to 2018. 
 
4.2.1 Ownership and industry distribution 
The following figures specify the distribution between the different types of owners. The 
ownership types are divided into the single largest owners, the second largest owners, 
the third largest owners and the full sample. Figure 2 below represents ownership type 
distribution in terms of the largest owners in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. As it can be seen 
from the figure, the major fraction of the largest owners in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki belongs 
to families (52%), measured by voting rights. As expected, corporations follow as the 
second largest owner group (17%). The state plays a relatively large role as a major owner 
in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki, but the share of ownership decreases among the second and 
third largest owners.  
 
 
Figure 2. The largest owners in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki.
15 %
52 %
7 %
7 %
4 %
6 %
9 %
The largest owners
Corporation Family Foreign Foundation Investment advisor Pension and Insurance State
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Figure 3 below indicates the distribution of the second largest owners in the Nasdaq 
OMX Helsinki stock exchange. Compared to the largest owners, the ownership is more  
concentrated between family, corporation, and pension and insurance companies, as 
their share of ownership totals over 80%. The main observation is that the share of family 
ownership has decreased significantly, while the share of corporations has increased to 
13%. Pension and insurance companies fundamentally impact on Finnish capital markets. 
Large institutions can increase the stability of the domestic capital markets, and thus 
their existence is vital for our market economy. Pension and insurance companies cover 
27% of the second largest owners in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. However, according to latest 
academic research (Farwis & Azees, 2019) pension and insurance companies might 
encourage a company’s top management to take more risk in their activities in order to 
gain higher compensations. Thus, institutional investors may temporarily increase a risk-
bearing functions within a company.  
 
From a strategic perspective, this argument is expected since institutional investors 
might have a lack of business-oriented mindset, and thus are not applicable for the major 
owner of a company. Yet, the capability of efficient monitoring and the enhancement of 
corporate governance is a reasonable assumption why foundations and institutional 
investors are usually the second and the third largest owner within a company. 
 
 
Figure 3. The second largest owners in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki.
13 %
43 %
5 %
3 %
6 %
27 %
3 %
The second largest owners
Corporation Family Foreign Foundation Investment advisor Pension and Insurance State
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Figure 4 illustrates the distribution of the third largest owners in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. 
As in the distribution of the second largest owners, the same development continues 
with the third largest owners. The portion of family ownership declines, whilst the share 
of pension and insurance companies, and corporations increases. Also, the share of 
investment advisor has increased to almost 10 %. 
 
 
Figure 4. The third largest owners in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. 
 
The distribution of the full sample ownership types indicates that families dominate the 
ownership structures with 43%, whilst corporations and pension and insurance 
companies share together more than one third of ownership types, 15% and 23% 
respectively. Also, an interesting finding is that the share of investment advisor as a 
major owner is relatively low (6%). Even though there is an enormous amount of extra 
capital lying, for instance, in venture, private equity and hedge funds, the share of 
publicly listed companies in their portfolios seem to be minimal. One possible 
explanation for this could be that the venture capital and private equity investors seek 
to invest in relatively young companies, with exceptional business ideas and exponential 
organic growth, and thus they do not want to invest in stable growth listed companies. 
14 %
36 %
2 %
2 %
8 %
37 %
1 %
The third largest owners
Corporation Family Foreign Foundation Investment advisor Pension and Insurance State
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Figure 5. The full sample of ownership types in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. 
  
Figure 6 below describes the distribution of domestic and foreign ownership among the 
single largest shareholders of Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. Based on the results in table 6, it 
can be highlighted that even though the market capitalization of foreign invested capital 
is relatively high in Finnish capital markets, the absolute amount of invested capital is in 
most cases minimal. A possible explanation for this stems from the fact that foreign 
investors usually do not have as in-depth knowledge as required about the Finnish 
capital markets, and hence the engagement rate to the development of a company 
through a significant portion of ownership might increase their portfolios’ idiosyncratic 
risk. 
 
 
Figure 6. The distribution of domestic and foreign ownership in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki.
14 %
43 %
5 %
4 %
6 %
24 %
4 %
The full sample 
Corporation Family Foreign Foundation Investment advisor Pension and Insurance State
89 %
11 %
Domestic and foreign ownership
Domestic Foreign
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Figure 7 below illustrates an important implication of this study. The industry distribution 
of Nasdaq OMX Helsinki is based on the three digits Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes. In the empirical part of this thesis, the industry dummy variables are formed 
by utilizing these SIC codes. The industries are divided as follows: Construction, 
Manufacturing, Mining, Retail, Service, Transportation, and Wholesale. As one can see 
from the figure, over 60 % of companies belong to manufacturing industry. Combined, 
service and manufacturing form over 80 % of companies in this dataset. The smallest 
industry is mining which only covers 1 % of observed companies.   
 
 
Figure 7. The industry distribution (SIC codes) in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. 
 
4.2.2 Statistical properties 
Table 3 below represents statistical properties and normality test of Nasdaq OMX 
Helsinki. The dataset includes 445 observations across the time period of 2014-2018. I 
have divided the variables into three different categories of which the first variable is 
considered as dependent variable, variables 2-13 as explanatory variables and variables 
14-17 as controlling variables.  
 
From the 445 observations, the mean of Tobin’s Q results 1,12. As the Tobin’s Q indicates 
the ratio between the market value of a company and the replacement cost of a 
company’s assets, one could argue that in the data sample the market values of 
4 %
61 %
1 %
3 %
21 %
8 % 2 %
Industry distribution
Construction Manufacturing Mining Retail Service Transportation Wholesale
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companies exceed their replacement cost of assets. Nonetheless, the median of Tobin’s 
Q for observed companies remains below 1 which indicates that over a half of the 
companies are still considered as undervalued. When looking at the industry distribution 
of observed companies, one may not be surprised of the Tobin’s Q results since over  half 
of the companies belong to manufacturing industry. The characteristic of manufacturing 
companies is large intangible assets that are not easily replaceable.  
 
According to Wooldridge (2016), normality plays an important role in statistical 
procedures as it ensures the validity of a dataset, throughout which empirical economic 
analysis can be proceeded. In this normality test, skewness and kurtosis are selected to 
indicate asymmetry of probability distribution, to identify whether or not the variables 
are normally distributed. From the table, one could interpret that Votes %, Votes over 
10%, 15%, 20%, and Family are fairly normal distributed. Yet, Jarque-Bera, which is a test 
that compares the shape of given distribution to that of normal distribution, rejects the 
null hypothesis of normal distribution in all the variables in the table. 
 
Consistent with the current market condition, the 95th percentile of the dataset includes 
some outlier values. This increases the mean and standard deviation of the Tobin’s Q 
ratio. Also, the size factor which is measured as a company’s total assets has large 
variation which indicates that the impact of very large and small companies is relatively 
high in this data sample. The outlier detection method is presented later in chapter 4. 
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Table 3. Statistical properties and normality test of Nasdaq OMX Helsinki.  
     
Variable Observations Mean Median Std.dev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera 
Tobin's Q  445 1,12 0,77 1,46 6,11 50,89 43158,0*** 
Votes % 445 0,25 0,20 0,18 1,04 3,29 82,0*** 
Votes over 10% 445 0,81 1,00 0,39 -1,61 3,59 198,6*** 
Votes over 15% 445 0,64 1,00 0,48 -0,57 1,32 76,1*** 
Votes over 20% 445 0,49 0,00 0,50 0,06 1,00 74,2*** 
CEO ownership 445 0,01 0,00 0,06 6,30 49,83 43604,73*** 
Corporation 445 0,16 0,00 0,36 1,91 4,63 318,86*** 
Family 445 0,52 1,00 0,50 -0,09 1,01 74,17*** 
Foreign 445 0,07 0,00 0,26 3,31 11,98 2311,1*** 
Foundation 445 0,07 0,00 0,25 3,45 12,91 2702,3*** 
Investment 
advisor 
445 0,04 0,00 0,19 4,81 24,22 10067,9*** 
Pension and 
Insurance 
445 0,06 0,00 0,24 3,68 14,55 3476,5*** 
State 445 0,09 0,00 0,28 2,97 9,80 1511,3*** 
Asset 
tangibility 
445 0,20 0,16 0,18 0,79 2,62 49,0*** 
Leverage 445 0,15 0,13 0,15 2,66 17,64 4500,3*** 
Sales growth 445 0,03 0,01 0,24 5,23 66,05 75741,0*** 
Size 445 1886,26 309,74 4802,17 5,36 38,42 25399,41*** 
 
Notes: The data series are yearly coverage from 2014 to 2018, Size (total assets) is presented as 
millions of euros, whilst asset tangibility, leverage, and sales growth as percentage / 100. 
Variables from 3 – 5 and 7 – 13 are dummy variables. 
 
 
4.2.3 Correlation coefficient 
Another essential implication of an empirical economic analysis is correlation coefficient 
between the selected variables. Correlation refers to the statistical relationship between 
selected variables or data. Correlation coefficient is a statistical measure which illustrate 
the relationship between a pair of variables, and hence ensures the unbiasedness of the 
data sample. (Wooldridge, 2016.) To confirm the validity of the data sample, none of the
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 independent variables should be constant and there should not be any perfect linear  
relationship between the pair of variables. To be clear, perfect relationship, also named 
as perfect collinearity, results 1. Generally, the frontier within which variables are 
“acceptable” is 0,7. Then, it can be concluded that there is no multicollinearity in the 
dataset. (Wooldridge, 2016.) In the next page, figure 8 illustrates the correlation 
coefficient matrix of the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki data sample. In the matrix, the 
abbreviations are as follows: CORP – corporation, FAMI – family, FOUN – foundation, IA 
– investment advisor, PI – pension and insurance, ASSET TANG – asset tangibility, LEV – 
leverage, and SG% - sales growth %. 
 
In the correlation coefficient matrix, an important observation is that votes %, votes over 
10%, 15%, and 20% have almost perfect collinearity between each other. To ensure the 
validity of a data set, a solution to evade a distortion of main results is that these 
bivariate variables are regressed in separate models. I also augmented the correlation 
matrix by including residuals into examination. Through this, I make sure that the 
explanatory variable(s) Xi are not correlated with the error term(s) Ɛt. 
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Figure 8.  The correlation coefficient matrix of Nasdaq OMX Helsinki.
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4.2.4 Outlier detection 
In the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki stock exchange, the status quo of value stocks is changing 
as number of growth stocks has gained ground in the recent years. Especially in the 
bullish market condition, growth stocks tend to be overvalued, as it is also in Nasdaq 
OMX Helsinki. Thus, reflecting this circumstance in the empirical part of this thesis, one 
should take under consideration the outlier values, which might have an impact on the 
main results of the thesis. To avoid this occurrence, I have excluded outlier values from 
the sample by utilizing winsorization at 98%. Simply, I replace the values below 1st 
percentile with the exact value at 1st percentile, and the values above 99th percentile 
with the exact values at 99th percentile. 
 
4.2.5 Endogeneity and survivorship bias 
Endogeneity is an economic analysis term which refers to the presence of an 
endogenous explanatory variable. For econometric analysis, endogeneity is a general 
problem that can cause challenges in multiple regression models. In a dataset, 
endogeneity is said to be present if an explanatory variable xi is correlated with an error  
term Ɛ. In essence, the error term Ɛ consists of relative information that cannot be 
explained by the underlying explanatory variables xi, xj,…, and thus needs to be corrected 
to improve the explanatory power of explanatory variables. There are a few main 
reasons behind the occurrence of endogeneity, such as (1) omitting important variables 
from the model, also named as omitted variable bias, (2) if the outcome variable is a 
explanator of xi, also called as simultaneity bias, and (3) measurement errors in 
regressors, such as imperfect proxy variables. (Wooldridge, 2016.)  
 
In this thesis, the endogeneity problem may occur between ownership and company 
performance. On one hand, the hypothesis of this thesis lies in the assumption that 
ownership has an impact on company performance, but on the other hand a plausible 
hypothesis could also be that a greater company performance tempts specific investors 
and owners. If so, the hypothesis converts to the situation where company performance 
impacts on ownership. The above-mentioned problem could be faced if the dataset used 
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would only consist of short time-period observations and time effect has not factored in. 
Evidently, company performance is neither constant nor intrinsic value because the 
underlying market condition, decisions and actions made by a company’s top 
management and many other policies and circumstances form a basis of a company’s 
future performance. (Wooldridge, 2016.) 
 
In addition to endogeneity and endogenous explanatory variables, survivorship bias has 
a relevant implication to the empirical research. The underlying assumption of 
survivorship bias is selection bias where the results, called as survivors, of a certain 
output are disproportionately estimated. Implicitly, it can be said that survivorship bias 
examines the omitted observations of the data set, and the possible consequences of 
omission. At the end of 2019, the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki stock exchange contains over 
150 companies from which only 89 is selected to this dataset. Because of the upward 
market trend, the number of listed companies in OMX Helsinki stock exchange has raised 
significantly, with over 20% compared to end of 2009. Between 2014 and 2018, 29 
companies were listed in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki, and as a result, survivorship bias  
increases fractionally through this occasion. The other aspect, delisting, is irrelevant, and 
thus the risk of an injurious impact of survivorship bias is very small since only a couple 
of companies have moved to another stock exchange from the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki 
during the sample period.
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5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A fundamental assumption in the field of finance is that for increased exposure to risk 
investors demand higher expected return – compensation. Ultimately, shareholders 
concentrate on the profitability and long-term success of the company. Hence, including 
Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable, describes most accurate a company’s valuation in this 
dataset. In this thesis, I disclose whether different ownership types result excess returns 
within the sample period 2014-2018 in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. I conduct a multivariate 
analysis and use dummy variables to demonstrate different ownership types. The 
industry dummies are used as binary variables that take value 1 if a company’s ownership 
type matches the SIC code, and otherwise 0. The regression I use replicates firm 
performance model used in Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Maury (2006). The model 
below measures how different ownership types impact on corporate performance by 
regressing one ownership type at a time against a company performance: 
 
(1) 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒)𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽2−5(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6−11(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦)𝑖𝑡 +  Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
 
where,  
  
α = intercept 
β1 (Ownership type) = Dummy variables (Corporation, Family, Foundation, Investment 
advisor, Pension and Insurance, and State), 
β2-5 (Controlling variables) = Asset tangibility, Leverage, Sales growth, and Size 
β6-11 (Industry) = Dummy variables (Construction, Manufacturing, Mining, Retail, Service, 
Transportation7, and Wholesale, 
Ɛ = error term, and 
it = company (i) and time period (t).
 
7 In all regression models, transportation includes communication, electric, gas and sanitary services.  
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The second model used replicates the ownership model with the difference that, now, 
voting rights are considered. The regression adds total votes (%), over 10% of voting 
rights, over 15% of voting rights, and over 20% of voting rights. The model measures, 
separately, whether different percentage thresholds of voting rights have an impact on 
corporate performance: 
 
(2) 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 / 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝)𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽2−5(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6−11(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦)𝑖𝑡 +  Ɛ𝑖𝑡 
 
where, 
 
β1 (Voting rights) = Total votes %, over 10%, 15%, 20% of voting rights, and CEO 
ownership 
β2-5 (Controlling variables) = Asset tangibility, Leverage, Sales growth %, and Size, 
β6-11 (Industry) = Dummy variables (Construction, Manufacturing, Mining, Retail, Service, 
Transportation, and Wholesale, 
Ɛ = error term, and 
it = company (i) and time period (t). 
 
5.1 Model specifications 
There are a few different estimation methods to estimate data. Generally, these methods 
consist of three different approaches: cross-sectional, panel, and time-series data. From 
these three, panel data has both cross-sectional and time-series dimension. In this 
chapter, I go through a justification of the selected estimation method and converse on 
the issues that should be taken under consideration while dealing with the data, such as 
multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity and random effect. To go through more specifically, 
the dataset of the thesis consists of multiple time-series and cross-sections. The dataset 
used in this empirical analysis includes firm-specific variables that change during the 
time period, and hence the selected category is panel data. To analyse the impact of 
firm-specific variables over time period 2014-2018, I use a linear regression model for 
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panel data. Panel data has specific characteristics because it can be based on either 
fixed- or random-effect. To provide proof estimations and results, the selection between 
fixed- and random-effect models is done by executing the Hausman test.  Instead of 
pooling together the observations of the panel data, the original panel data is more 
accurate as it considers the changes of firm-specific characteristics between companies.  
 
5.1.1 Hausman test 
To test whether selected econometric model includes misspecifications, I run the 
Hausman test (Hausman 1978) to illustrate the comparison of two different panel data 
models. The underlying function behind the Hausman test is that it evaluates whether 
models´ error terms (Ɛ) are correlated with the explanatory variables. The null 
hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the preferred model is the random effects model 
whilst the alternative hypothesis is the fixed effects model. (Wooldridge 2016.)  
 
To guarantee the reliability of estimations, I focus on two methods for estimating 
unobserved effect panel data models, fixed and random effects. The fixed effects (or 
unobserved effect) model is a linear regression model where an unobserved variable, 
such as intercept, changes cross-sectionally but remains fixed over time, whilst the slope 
estimates are fixed both cross-sectionally and over time. To illustrate more detailed, two 
assumptions need to be fulfilled: at least two observations for each variable and time 
variation over time. By presuming that the explanatory variables are correlated with the 
error term (Ɛ), the fixed effects model forms a variable, ai, which accounts for the specific 
effect of the unobserved entity and leaves the rest of the disturbance, which varies over 
time cross-sectionally, in the error term uit, such following: (Wooldridge, 2016.) 
 
(3)    𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , t = 1, 2, …, T 
 
Reflecting to this thesis, the fixed effects model does have some limitation. For instance, 
the model cannot control for variables that vary over time, such as sales growth and total 
assets. Yet, this limitation can be disregarded by including dummy variables in the model 
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for units and time. Regardless of this solution, one main problem that occurs is that the 
more dummy variables are included in the regression, the more noise is controlled for in 
the regression model. Since the model does not endure changes during the time period, 
the random effects model becomes relevant, and thus should be taken under 
consideration. (Wooldridge 2016.) 
 
The random effects model refers to the unobserved effects panel data model where the 
unobserved effect is presumed to have an uncorrelated relationship with the 
explanatory variables in each time periods and across different entities. The random 
effects model is an alternative way to estimate a linear regression model for panel data. 
(Wooldridge, 2016.)  
 
(4)   𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘 +  𝑎𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
The equation above turns into a random effects model when we have an assumption 
that unobserved effect 𝑎𝑖 is uncorrelated with explanatory variables as following: 
 
(5)   𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘,𝑎𝑖) = 0, 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 ; 𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝑘 
 
Conversely to the fixed effects model, the intercept of the linear regression model is 
described as an average of the variations in the entities over time. This entitles the usage 
of dummy variables that remain constant over time, such as industry variables. Thus, 
selecting the random effects model as a proxy for the regression model of this thesis is 
more plausible for the estimations. (Wooldridge, 2016.) In the Hausman test, I use the 
Wallace-Hussain (1969) random effects method as an approach for variance estimators. 
 
5.1.2 Further discussion of estimations 
In most econometric regressions, the random effects model provides more accurate 
estimation for observed variables. This argument is also valid in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki 
data sample as variations in variables over time and the usage of dummy variable should 
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be included in the estimation. Because of the nature of ownership dummies, the usage 
of fixed effects model as a proxy for regression is not adequate. Evidently, the fixed 
effects model omits important explanatory variables from the regression due to 
collinearity, which stems from no variation over time in the variables. Consequently, the 
Hausman test cannot be implemented. (Wooldridge, 2016.) 
 
Another reason of why the fixed effects model cannot be executed in the Nasdaq OMX 
Helsinki dataset originates from the relatively short time period (5 years). Simultaneously, 
there are fractional variations in ownership structures. Thereby, the probability of 
insignificant results increases which stems from the fact that the fixed effect model relies 
in some changes in ownership structures.
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6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter represents the main empirical results of this thesis. The main results are 
based on three baseline models represented in chapter 5: the ownership type model, 
the extension of the ownership type model, and the voting rights model in which the 
CEO ownership is included.  
 
6.1 Ownership type model 
The ownership type model from equation (1) illustrates the relationship between 
ownership structure and a company’s financial performance by utilizing Tobin’s Q, a 
forward-looking performance indicator, as a regressor. Based on the Hausman test, the 
multiple regression uses the random effects model which is testified as an applicable 
approach in chapter 5. In this regression model, the industry dummy variables are also 
used but not reported in the table. The probability of the Hausman test exceeds 0,05 in 
in each regression indicating that the null hypothesis – the random effects model is not 
applicable – is rejected in favour of an alternative hypothesis, and thus the random 
effects model becomes valid. To avoid dummy variable trap, I exclude one ownership 
dummy variable at each time in regression.  
 
In the results, one may see that there are many ownership types that reports significant 
results. Investment advisor and Pension and Insurance ownership types report 
significant results at 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level with respect to Tobin’s Q. This could be 
based on the fact that in the upward market condition, both investment advisor and 
pension and insurance owners have increased their level of riskiness in the stock market 
via which targeted companies have gained crucial capital to rapid their financial 
performance, and enhanced more efficient monitoring and controlling of companies’ top 
management. Conversely to earlier academic literature, state ownership type has a 
positive impact on the Tobin’s Q, even though insignificant. Interestingly, when omitting 
the investment advisor variable, it seems that the ownership variables become 
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significant at 1 % and 5 % level, with a negative impact. This indicates that investment 
advisor variable is playing an important role in regression.  
 
In the academic literature, there is a bifurcation of opinions whether asset tangibility has 
a positive or an inverse relationship with Tobin’s Q. For example, Margaritis and Psillaki 
(2010) have found that asset tangibility has a positive relationship with a company’s 
financial performance. Further,  Pouraghajan, Malekian, Emamgholipour, Lotfollahpour, 
and Bagheri (2012) state that asset tangibility has a positive relationship with company 
performance. Conversely, Almeida and Campello (2007) report that asset tangibility has 
an inverse relationship with financial performance of a company. There could be multiple 
reasons for the bifurcation of the results such as time period, market condition, location 
of the examined market, and ownership specifications within the examined country.   
 
Prior academic literature suggests that founders bring unique, value-adding skills to a 
company resulting in superior market valuations. However, conversely to earlier studies, 
which suggest that family ownership has mainly positive impact on company 
performance, the results indicate that family ownership have both negative and positive 
relationship with Tobin’s Q, resulting only a couple of significant values at 1 %, 5 % and 
10 % level. This indicates an important implication that the status quo of family 
ownership seems to be changing, at least within 2014-2018 in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. 
From the four controlling variables, sales growth reports positively significant results at 
5 % level, whilst leverage has negative and significant results at 1 % level. This finding 
indicates that in the upward market condition companies with relatively rapid sales 
growth report higher Tobin’s Q, whereas an increase in the leverage ratio leads to 
decrease in Tobin’s Q. As expected from earlier research (e.g. Anderson & Reeb 2003), 
the size factor has a negative impact on Tobin’s Q. The R-squared are reported at the end 
of the table. 
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Table 4. The random effects model of ownership type model, Nasdaq OMX Helsinki.  
 
Notes: The first row is the coefficient of the variable and the number in parenthesis presents t-
statistics. *, ** and *** illustrate the significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. 
Variables from 1 – 7 are dummy variables. 
 
6.2 Extension of ownership type model 
In this section, I present an alternative extension to the ownership type model where 
each ownership type is regressed alone, with respect to Tobin’s Q. Similarly, as in table 
5, the results provided in table 6 indicate that both Investment advisor and Pension and  
Insurance ownership variables have significant and positive relationship with Tobin’s Q.
     
  
  Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Corporation 
 0,03 0,21 0,35* -0,80*** -0,48** -0,15 
 (0,26) (1,11) (1,75) (-3,15) (-2,18) (-0,73) 
Family 
-0,03  0,18 0,32* -0,83*** -0,51** -0,18 
(-0,26)  (1,07) (1,77) (-3,56) (-2,54) (-0,96) 
Foreign 
-0,22 -0,18  0,14 -1,01*** -0,69*** -0,37 
(-1,11) (-1,07)  (0,59) (-3,72) (-2,87) (-1,60) 
Foundation 
-0,35* -0,32* -0,14  -1,15*** -0,83*** -0,50** 
(-1,75) (-1,76) (-0,59)  (-4,07) (-3,20) (-2,05) 
IA 
0,80*** 0,83*** 1,01*** 1,15***  0,32 0,65** 
(3,16) (3,56) (3,72) (4,07)  (1,06) (2,33) 
PI 
0,48** 0,51** 0,69*** 0,83*** -0,32  0,33 
(2,18) (2,54) (2,87) (3,20) (-1,06)  (1,39) 
State 
0,15 0,18 0,37 0,50** -0,65** -0,33  
(0,73) (0,96) (1,60) (2,05) (-2,33) (-1,39)  
Asset 
tangibility 
0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 0,06 
(0,22) (0,22) (0,22) (0,22) (0,22) (0,22) (0,22) 
Leverage 
-1,74*** -1,74*** -1,74*** -1,74*** -1,74*** -1,74*** -1,74*** 
(-4,77) (-4,77) (-4.77) (-4,77) (-4,77) (-4,77) (-4,77) 
Sales growth 
0,62** 0,62** 0,62** 0,62** 0,62** 0,62** 0,62** 
(2,54) (2,54) (2,54) (2,54) (2,54) (2,54) (2,54) 
Size 
-0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 
(-1,57) (-1,57) (1,57) (-1,57) (-1,57) (-1,57) (-1,57) 
Constant 
1,32*** 1,29*** 1,10*** 0,97*** 2,11*** 1,80*** 1,47*** 
(6,36) (7,50) (4,72) (3,99) (7,41) (7,24) (5,69) 
R2  0,239 0,239 0,239 0,239 0,239 0,239 0,239 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Hausman test 
p-value 
0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 
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As in table 5, the foundation variable reports negative results with respect to Tobin’s Q.  
Similarly, state ownership reports positive but insignificant results with respect to Tobin’s 
Q. Interestingly, family ownership has negative, even though insignificant, relationship 
with Tobin’s Q. From four controlling variables, sales growth and leverage remain with 
the same sign and at the same significance level, and the size variable is negative at all 
examination levels. The probabilities of the Hausman test, and the R-squared are 
reported at the end of the table. 
 
Table 5. The random effects model of the extension of the ownership type model, Nasdaq OMX 
Helsinki.  
     
  
  Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Corporation 
0,00       
(0,01)       
Family 
 -0,09      
 (-0,90)      
Foreign 
  -0,27     
  (-1,61)     
Foundation 
   -0,36**    
   (-2,00)    
IA 
    0,85***   
    (3,66)   
PI  
    0,50**  
     (2,55)  
State 
      0,06 
      (0,31) 
Asset 
tangibility 
-0,05 -0,10 0,00 0,04 -0,09 0,01 -0,06 
(-0,20) (-0,37) (0,00) (0,13) (-0,33) (0,03) (-0,23) 
Leverage 
-1,43*** -1,47*** -1,40*** -1,52*** -1,65*** -1,45*** -1,43*** 
(-3,91) (-4,00) (-3,84) (-4,15) (-4,53) (-4,02) (-3,92) 
Sales growth 
0,76*** 0,77*** 0,76*** 0,71*** 0,68*** 0,72*** 0,76*** 
(3,10) (3,16) (3,11) (2,90) (2,80) (2,97) (3,12) 
Size 
-0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 
(-0,67) (-0,90) (-0,58) (-0,80) (-0,41) (-1,57) (-0,74) 
Constant 
1,31*** 1,39*** 1,33*** 1,33*** 1,31*** 1,27*** 1,32*** 
(7,61) (7,32) (7,70) (7,71) (7,63) (7,34) (7,61) 
R2  0,192 0,194 0,197 0,199 0,217 0,204 0,192 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Hausman test 
p-value 0,991 0,991 0,991 0,991 0,988 0,986 0,989 
 
Notes: The first row is the coefficient of the variable and the number in parenthesis presents t-
statistics. *, ** and *** illustrate the significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. 
Variables from 1 – 7 are dummy variables. 
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6.3 Voting rights model 
The following table 7 presents the results from the equation 2 of the study, voting rights 
model. Total votes %, and each voting right thresholds are regressed separately, and the 
remain variables are included in each regression. The voting rights model indicates the 
impact of voting power on company performance. Further, the CEO ownership variable 
is added to expand the research. All the multiple regressions are based on the random 
effects model.  
 
Based on the results in table 7, it can be stated that the voting power has an inverse 
relationship with the financial performance of a company, measured by Tobin’s Q. 
Interestingly, the first threshold (votes over 10%) reports negative and significant values 
at 1% level whilst the second threshold (votes over 15%) reports negative values but the 
reported results are less significant. The same trend continues with the third threshold 
(votes over 20%) where the sign is negative, but the significance is even lower than in 
the second threshold. This indicates that even though the voting right has an inverse 
relationship with the financial performance of a company, an increase in voting right 
percentage lowers the significance with respect to Tobin’s Q. The CEO ownership variable 
has a negative and insignificant impact on Tobin’s Q. An increase in CEO’s ownership 
decreases Tobin’s Q with 0,0063 units.  
 
From the industry dummy variables, construction, retail and wholesale report negative 
and significant results at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % significance level, whilst service reports 
positive and significant results, at 1 % level, with respect to Tobin’s Q. As shown in the 
results of the ownership type model, leverage and sales growth report significant results, 
at 1 % level. 
 
 62  
Table 6. The random effects model of voting rights, Nasdaq OMX Helsinki. 
 
   
  
  
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Votes %  
-0,61**     
(-2,42)     
Votes > 10%  
-0,61***    
 (-5,53)    
Votes > 15%   
-0,30***   
  (-3,36)   
Votes > 20%    
-0,27***  
   (-3,07)  
CEO ownership    
 -0,63 
   
 (-0,63) 
Construction 
-0,76*** -0,74*** -0,81*** -0,85*** -0,75*** 
(-2,67) (-2,72) (-2,88) (-3,00) (-2,62) 
Manufacturing 
-0,17 -0,15 -0,23 -0,23 -0,21 
(-1,09) (-1,01) (-1,51) (-1,46) (-1,31) 
Mining 
-0,56 -0,59 -0,73 -0,67 -0,74* 
(-1,26) (-1,39) (-1,70)* (-1,46) (-1,70) 
Retail 
-0,56* -0,49* -0,60** -0,63** -0,57** 
(-1,95) (-1,77) (-2,10) (-2,19) (-1,97) 
Service 
0,53*** 0,52*** 0,44*** 0,49*** 0,46*** 
(3,76) (3,83) (3,15) (3,53) (3,32) 
Transportation 
0,03 0,01 -0,05 -0,05 -0,02 
(0,15) (0,03) (-0,23) (-0,20) (-0,10) 
Wholesale 
-0,73* -1,00** -0,91** -0,82* -0,70 
(-1,69) (-2,36) (-2,08) (-1,90) (-1,60) 
Asset tangibility 
-0,00 0,06 0,01 -0,01 -0,07 
(-0,00) (0,24) (0,05) (-0,04) (-0,26) 
Leverage 
-1,45*** -1,39*** -1,44*** -1,39*** -1,37*** 
(-4,00) (-3,94) (-4,01) (-3,84) (-3,64) 
Sales growth 
0,77*** 0,79*** 0,80*** 0,78*** 0,76*** 
(3,16) (3,34) (3,31) (3,22) (3,10) 
Size 
-0,00 -0,00* -0,00 -0,00 -0,00 
(-0,72) (-1,68) (-0,98) (-0.67) (-0,72) 
Constant 
1,43*** 1,76*** 1,55*** 1,46*** 1,33*** 
(8,02) (9,49) (8,41) (8.24) (7,63) 
R2  0,203 0,246 0,213 0,209 0,193 
N 445 445 445 445 445 
Hausman test       
p-value 
0,991 0,989 0,991 0,991 0,986 
 
Notes: The first row is the coefficient of the variable and the number in parenthesis represents 
t-statistics. *, ** and *** illustrates the significance at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. 
Variables from 2 – 4 and 6 – 12 are dummy variables. 
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6.4 Robustness of results 
To ensure the robustness of the results, I present a few standard tests which have an 
essential impact on the main results of this study.  
 
6.4.1 Heteroskedasticity 
Heteroskedasticity refers to the condition where the variance of the error term(s) is 
constant, conditional on the explanatory variable(s). Similarly, homoskedasticity is not 
present when the variance of the unobserved factors fluctuates across the population. 
To test whether sample has heteroskedasticity, I conduct Wald’s test in Eviews. I test 
simultaneously multiple variables if they differ from zero. The results are as expected: 
the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity is rejected in favour of an alternative 
hypothesis that the data contains heteroskedasticity. Furthermore, for serial correlation, 
I run the Breusch-Pagan test. The probability (p-value < 0,05) of the test indicates that 
the null hypothesis − no cross-section dependence (correlation) in residuals − cannot be 
rejected, and hence stays valid. 
 
6.4.2 Normality 
The second robustness check test is normality, which is also presented in chapter 4. 
Under the normality assumption, error terms are normally distributed in all observations. 
To conduct a test whether this assumption holds, I use Jarque-Bera test, which is 
illustrated in table 3 in chapter 4. The results support that the assumption of normality 
is rejected in favour of non-normal distribution for all variables used in the data sample. 
According to Wooldridge (2016), this issue could be resolved by utilizing the central limit 
theorem, a probability theory which implies that the independent random variables 
have a distribution that seems to standard normal when the sample size of a dataset 
increases. Thus, an increase in the size of a data sample may correct the non-normality. 
Yet, this central limit theorem does not invalidate the test results, so the assumption of 
a dataset being normally distributed is not valid. 
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As can be seen from the normality test in table 3 in chapter 4, the size variable (total 
assets of a company) has the largest fluctuation from normal distribution based on the 
reported skewness and kurtosis. Thus, to guarantee the robustness of the results, I test 
a lagged form of the size variable in all regression models. This lagged form of the size 
variable is replicated from Anderson, et. al (2003). The outcome of this extension can be 
found in Appendices 2, 3 and 4. 
 
6.4.3 Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity refers to an econometric situation where the explanatory variables of 
a multiple regression model have a high correlation among each other. Multicollinearity 
is expressed as a correlation matrix in chapter 4. As shown in the descriptive statistics, 
the correlation among the explanatory variables remains within acceptable limits (< 0,7), 
excluding voting rights variables. This issue is disregarded by regressing voting right 
variables separately in each multiple regression models.
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7 CONCLUSION 
The agency problem is a serious issue for companies since it increases the costs of 
companies. There might occur conflicts between different parties, and hence the 
alignment of interests among a company’s shareholders is a troublesome issue.  
Although there is a significant volume of research that is conducted on the ownership 
structure and its impact on corporate performance, yet the issue seems inconsistent and 
indecisive. Therefore, this study attempts to scrutinize the behaviour of the sample of 
Finnish listed companies to add the contribution to the existing literature. The purpose 
of this study is to examine and analyse whether a company’s ownership structure and 
amount of voting rights affect corporate performance. The examination is done by 
studying a balanced panel data sample which is limited to concern Nasdaq OMX Helsinki 
stock exchange and by applying multiple regression models to understand the profound 
interconnection between a company’s owners and valuation from different point of 
views.  
 
Based on the main results of the empirical examination, one could conclude that there 
exists a bidirectional relationship between a company’s financial performance and 
ownership structure, yet the scope of the impact fluctuates among different types of 
owners and voting right thresholds.  
 
To measure a company’s performance, I use Tobin’s Q as a regressor in ownership type, 
voting rights and CEO ownership models. To ensure robustness of the main results and 
to avoid dummy variable trap, I omit one ownership type dummy variable from each 
regression model. The ownership type model reports interesting results. Within the time 
period of 2014-2018, one could argue that, in Nasdaq OMX Helsinki, companies that 
have an investment advisor or a pension and insurance company as a major owner seem 
to generate positive and significant values on a company’s financial performance. The 
explanation for this could be that investment advisor and pension and insurance 
companies form a strong mainstay for the ownership structure with extra capital and 
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wide interconnections. These two owners usually participate actively in the 
management as a major owner by having members on the board.  
 
Another interesting implication is the strength of family ownership’s impact on a 
company’s performance. Results imply that family ownership has partly positive and 
negative but insignificant effect on Tobin’s Q. The results are surprising since earlier 
literature suggests that family ownership has outperformed other ownership types. 
Based on common premises, foundations should act similarly to pension and insurance 
companies in their management and monitoring activities, and thus it would be 
consistent that they would increase a company’s performance. However, results imply 
that they have a negative and significant impact on a company’s performance. An 
underlying explanation for this issue could be found from corporate governance 
practices and it stems from the fact that their competence as a major owner in a certain 
company is not adequate to efficient management and multi-level monitoring. 
 
I extend the research by adding an alternative regression to ownership type model 
where I regress each variable separately, ceteris paribus. The results are consistent with 
the ownership type model. Investment advisor and Pension and Insurance ownership 
variables remain positive and significant, as well as foundation reports negative and 
significant results at 5 % level. The probability of Hausman test and R-squared that are 
reported at the end of the table remain with almost same values.  
 
In the second regression model, voting rights model, the results show that there is an 
inverse relationship with the voting rights and Tobin’s Q. The first threshold (votes over 
10%) reports negative and significant values at 1% level whilst the second threshold 
(votes over 15%) reports negative values but the reported results are less significant. The 
same trend continues with the third threshold (votes over 20%) where the sign is 
negative, but the significance is even lower than in the second threshold. This indicates 
that even though the voting right has an inverse relationship with the financial 
performance of a company, an increase in voting right percentage lowers the significance
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with respect to Tobin’s Q. The negative sign of the voting rights is consistent with earlier 
studies such as Maury & Pajuste (2005). The CEO ownership variable has a negative and 
insignificant impact on company performance which is in line with earlier studies 
(Griffith, 1999; Kim & Lu, 2011). Along with the voting rights and CEO ownership, I 
augment industry dummies to examine synergy of voting rights and industries on a 
company’s financial performance. Construction, retail and wholesale industries report 
significantly negative values, whilst service industry has positive a positive impact on 
company performance in all examination levels. 
 
Future academic researchers can expand this study by using a larger sample of 
companies. In addition, the current study uses only a five-year time frame from 2014 to 
2018, which can also be expanded. Further, this thesis excludes companies in the 
banking and financial industry finance, leasing and investment companies due to their 
specific regulation policies. Hence, it would be intriguing to investigate more on those 
companies, and possibly to compare the Nordic countries with each other as well. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Non-selected companies 
Company Industry Reason for exclusion 
Aktia Bank Plc Banking Industry 
Altia Plc Consumer Goods Listed in 2018 
AS Tallink Grupp FDR Industrials Listed in 2018 
Asiakastieto Group Plc Financial Services Industry, listed in 2015 
CapMan Plc Financial Services Industry 
Citycon Plc Financial Services Industry 
Consti Yhtiöt Plc Industrials Listed in 2015 
DNA Plc Telecommunications Listed in 2016 
Endomines Plc Basic Materials Listed in Stockholm stock 
exchange 
eQ Plc Financial Services Industry 
Evli Pankki Plc Financial Services Industry, listed in 2015 
Harvia Plc Consumer Goods Listed in 2018 
Hoivatilat Plc Financial Services Industry, listed in 2017 
Investors House Plc Financial Services Industry 
Kamux Plc Consumer Services Listed in 2017 
Kojamo Plc Financial Services Industry, listed in 2018 
Kotipizza Group Plc Consumer Goods Listed in 2015 
Lehto Group Plc Industrials Listed in 2016 
Lemminkäinen Industrials Delisted 2017 
Neo Industrial Plc Industrials Industry (Investments) 
Nixu Plc Technology Listed in 2018 
Nordea Bank Plc Financial Services Industry 
Oma Säästöpankki Plc Financial Services Industry 
Ovaro Kiinteistösijoitus 
Plc 
Financial Services Industry 
Panostaja Plc Financial Services Industry 
Pihlajalinna Plc Health Care Listed in 2015 
PKC Group Plc Industrials Delisted 2017 
Qt Group Plc Technology Listed in 2016 
Robit Plc Industrials Listed in 2017 
Rovio Entertainment Plc Consumer Goods Listed in 2017 
Sampo Plc A Financial Services Industry 
Sievi Capital Plc Financial Services Industry 
Siili Solutions Plc Technology Listed in 2016 
Silmäasema Plc Health Care Listed in 2017 
Soprano Plc Technology Listed in 2014 
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Sotkamo Silver Plc Basic Materials Listed in Stockholm stock 
exchange 
Sponda Plc Real Estate Industry, delisted 
SSAB A Basic Materials Listed in 2014 
SSAB B Basic Materials Listed in 2014 
Taaleri Plc Financial Services Industry, listed in 2016 
Talenom Plc Industrials Listed in 2017 
Techopolis Plc Real Estate Industry, delisted 
Telia Company Telecommunications Listed in Stockholm stock 
exchange 
Terveystalo Plc Health Care Listed in 2017 
Tokmanni Group Plc Consumer Services Listed in 2016 
Valmet Plc Industrials Listed in 2014 
Ålandsbanken Plc A Financial Services Industry 
Ålandsbanken Plc B Financial Services Industry 
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Appendix 2. Lagged size variable, ownership type model 
     
  
  Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Corporation 
 0,07 0,20 0,32* -0,76*** -0,46** -0,15 
 (0,55) (1,04) (1,59) (-3,01) (-2,18) (-0,76) 
Family 
-0,07  0,13 0,25 -0,83*** -0,53** -0,22 
(-0,55)  (0,75) (1,36) (-3,58) (-2,69) (-1,17) 
Foreign 
-0,20 -0,13  0,12 -0,97*** -0,66*** -0,35 
(-1,04) (-0,75)  (0,51) (-3,51) (-2,81) (-1,58) 
Foundation 
-0,32 -0,25 -0,12  -1,08*** -0,78*** -0,47** 
(-1,60) (-1,36) (-0,51)  (-3,81) (-3,14) (-2,00) 
IA 
0,76*** 0,83*** 0,97*** 1,08***  0,30 0,61** 
(3,01) (3,58) (3,51) (3,81)  (1,01) (2,19) 
PI 
0,46** 0,53*** 0,66*** 0,78*** -0,30  0,31 
(2,18) (2,68) (2,81) (3,14) (-1,01)  (1,31) 
State 
0,15 0,22 0,35 0,47** -0,61** -0,31  
(0,76) (1,17) (1,58) (2,00) (-2,10) (-1,31)  
Asset 
tangibility 
0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 
(0,36) (0,36) (0,36) (0,36) (0,36) (0,36) (0,36) 
Leverage 
-1,74*** -1,74*** -1,74*** -1,74*** -1,74*** -1,74*** -1,74*** 
(-4,77) (-4,77) (-4.77) (-4,77) (-4,77) (-4,77) (-4,77) 
Sales growth 
0,61** 0,61** 0,61** 0,61** 0,61** 0,61** 0,61** 
(2,53) (2,53) (2,53) (2,53) (2,53) (2,53) (2,53) 
Lagged size 
-0,05* -0,05* -0,05* -0,05* -0,05* -0,05* -0,05* 
(-1,96) (-1,96) (1,96) (-1,96) (-1,96) (-1,96) (-1,96) 
Constant 
1,55*** 1,48*** 1,10*** 1,23*** 2,31*** 2,01*** 1,70*** 
(6,46) (7,47) (4,72) (4,43) (7,66) (6,87) (5,57) 
R2  0,241 0,241 0,241 0,241 0,241 0,241 0,241 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Hausman test 
p-value 
0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 0,999 
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Appendix 3. Lagged size variable, extension of ownership model 
     
  
  Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Corporation 
0,01       
(0,06)       
Family 
 -0,14      
 (-1,43)      
Foreign 
  -0,24     
  (-1,45)     
Foundation 
   -0,32*    
   (-1,84)    
IA 
    0,83***   
    (3,58)   
PI      0,52***  
      (2,73)  
State 
      0,11 
      (0,60) 
Asset 
tangibility 
0,01 -0,05 0,05 0,08 -0,04 0,09 -0,00 
(0,03) (-0,17) (0,18) (0,29) (-0,13) (0,33) (-0,01) 
Leverage 
-1,45*** -1,50*** -1,41*** -1,52*** -1,66*** -1,46*** -1,45*** 
(3,97) (-4,12) (-3,90) (-4,17) (-4,58) (-4,05) (-3,99) 
Sales growth 
0,74*** 0,76*** 0,75*** 0,70*** 0,67*** 0,70*** 0,75*** 
(3,05) (3,13) (3,06) (2,87) (2,76) (2,88) (3,08) 
Lagged size 
-0,06 -0,05** -0,03 -0,03 -0,03 -0,06** -0,04 
(-1,51) (-1,96) (-1,29) (-1,37) (-1,19) (-2,29) (-1,63) 
Constant 
1,45*** 1,62*** 1,45*** 1,45*** 1,41*** 1,47*** 1,48*** 
(7,41) (7,07) (7,41) (7,43) (7,29) (7,60) (7,37) 
R2  0,195 0,199 0,199 0,202 0,218 0,209 0,196 
N 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 
Hausman test 
p-value 0,990 0,990 0,990 0,990 0,988 0,986 0,989 
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Appendix 4. Lagged size variable, voting rights model 
 
   
  
  
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Tobin's Q 
Votes % 
-0,67**     
(-2,65)     
Votes > 10%  
-0,63***    
 (-5,76)    
Votes > 15%   
-0,34***   
  (-3,70)   
Votes > 20%    
-0,29***  
   (-3,31)  
CEO ownership    
 -0,99 
   
 (-0,97) 
Construction 
-0,69** -0,66** -0,74*** -0,80*** -0,70** 
(-2,42) (-2,38) (-2,60) (-2,78) (-2,43) 
Manufacturing 
-0,11 -0,08 -0,17 -0,17 -0,16 
(-0,70) (-0,54) (-1,09) (-1,08) (-1,02) 
Mining 
-0,48 -0,49 -0,66 -0,60 -0,69* 
(-1,08) (-1,16) (-1,53) (-1,39) (-1,68) 
Retail 
-0,47 -0,37 -0,49* -0,51* -0,49** 
(-1,59) (-1,30) (-1,70) (-1,85) (-1,68) 
Service 
0,55*** 0,55*** 0,46*** 0,51*** 0,48*** 
(3,93) (4,06) (3,30) (3,68) (3,42) 
Transportation 
0,12 0,09 0,03 0,04 0,04 
(0,51) (0,40) (0,14) (0,16) (0,15) 
Wholesale 
-0,62 -0,85** -0,79* -0,72 -0,60 
(-1,43) (-2,01) (-1,82) (-1,65) (-1,37) 
Asset tangibility 
0,09 0,16 0,12 0,08 -0,00 
(0,32) (0,61) (0,44) (0,30) (-0,02) 
Leverage 
-1,48*** -1,40*** -1,47*** -1,41*** -1,36*** 
(-4,09) (-3,99) (-4,11) (-3,93) (-3,62) 
Sales growth 
0,75*** 0,77*** 0,78*** 0,76*** 0,74*** 
(3,10) (3,26) (3,25) (3,16) (3,03) 
Lagged size 
-0,04* -0,06*** -0,05** -0,04** -0,04* 
(-1,87) (-2,67) (-2,27) (-1,93) (-1,70) 
Constant 
1,61*** 2,01*** 1,78*** 1,64*** 1,50*** 
(7,92) (9,48) (8,39) (8,15) (7,44) 
R2  0,208 0,246 0,220 0,215 0,197 
N 445 445 445 445 445 
Hausman test     
p-value 
0,990 0,989 0,991 0,990 0,987 
 
